Global Effects of US “New Economy” Shocks: the Role of Capital-Skill Complementarity by Tyers, Rod & Yang, Yongzheng
Global Effects of US “New Economy” Shocks:
the Role of Capital-Skill Complementarity*
Rod Tyers
Faculty of Economics and Commerce
Australian National University
Yongzheng Yang**
Asia-Pacific School of Economics and Management
Australian National University
February 2001
Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics No. 387
Australian National University
* The research reported is from a project funded by the Australian Research Council (Large
Grant A00000201).
** As of February 2001, Dr. Yang takes up a position with the International Monetary Fund.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors alone and are in no way
representative of views held in the IMF or any of its policy positions.
1Global Effects of US “New Economy” Shocks:
the Role of Capital-Skill Complementarity
Abstract
Long run technical change since the 1970s can be characterised alternatively as capital
enhancement when capital and skill are complementary, or skill enhancement when capital
and skill are substitutes.  These characterisations are not equivalent in the short run, however,
particularly in the capital-mobile late 1990s, because the implications of the shocks for the
return to installed physical capital, and hence the global distribution of investment, depend on
which of the two is chosen.  The extent of this non-equivalence is demonstrated in this paper,
which examines the short run effects of the acceleration of technology shocks in the US
during the late 1990s.  Two comparative static multi-product macroeconomic models are
constructed around the alternative characterisations and technology shocks are introduced in
the US alone.  A US economic expansion and gains to US factor owners are common to both
but the sectoral and distributional effects within the US economy differ substantially between
them.  The effects on other regions follow primarily from changes in the distribution of global
investment and the associated changes in real exchange rates and hence they are also sensitive
to the technology characterisation chosen.
1. Introduction
The long boom of the 1990s in the US was underpinned by strong growth in labour
productivity1, stemming at least in part from extraordinary growth in the information
technology sector and the spread of its products and services throughout the economy.2  This
process is causing a dramatic change in the composition of the capital stock.  The new
information technology is declining in price relative to other capital so that its value share is
rising less quickly than its productivity. 3  Yet, in the US at least, there has been a substantial
rise in the value share of “equipment” and a corresponding decline in the share of
“structures”.4  Growth in the “effective” capital stock has therefore accelerated.  To the extent
that capital, and more particularly equipment, is complementary with skill, this is likely to
explain recent growth in the skill premium in the US.5  Expectations associated with the
information technology boom also explain a significant rise in US investment during the
1990s, financed at least in part by savings from abroad.
                                                
1
 See, for example, Oliner and Sichel (2000), who analysis the observed “one percentage point step-up in
productivity growth between the first and the second halves of the decade” of the 1990s.
2
 The analysis by Oliner and Sichel (2000) accounts for the special effects of computer obsolescence highlighted
by Whelan (2000) and attributes about two thirds of the half-decade productivity step-up to (i) increased output
in the computer and software production industry and (ii) increased use of information technology in other
sectors.
3
 See Greenwood et al. (1997, 2000: Figure 1).
4
 See Krusell et al. (1997), Figure 1.
2Insights into the technical change of this period are available from the extensive
recent literature on the determinants of the relatively poor labour market performance by
unskilled workers.  A prevalent conclusion in that literature is that this is due to technical
change and, in particular, skill-biased change associated with the introduction of information
technology.6  One clear statement of the technical implications of this finding is by Kahn and
Lim (1998).  They take the view that skill and labour have a larger than unit substitution
elasticity and that computer-based automation enhances skilled labour time, increasing
“effective” skill hours per actual skilled worker and thereby raising the marginal product of
skilled relative to unskilled workers.7  According to this view, the technical change acts
directly to change the factor-specific parameters of the production function.
While there is ample evidence that labour and skill are substitutes, a role for capital-
skill complementarity was recognised early on by Griliches (1969) and Fallon and Layard
(1975).  More recently, Goldin and Katz (1998), took the view that skill-capital
complementarity was a key determinant of the US skill premium throughout the 20th century.
This view is examined more formally by Krusell et al. (1997) who focus on the US in the
period between 1963 and 1991.  They conclude that the observed changes in US skill premia
can be explained without resort to changes in the fundamental parameters of the production
function.  They formulate a simple nested CES production system that embodies capital skill
complementarity and find that skill premia are explained almost entirely by readily observable
factor accumulation.  Their results are aided by the disaggregation of the capital stock into
“equipment” and “structures”, the incorporation of complementarity between equipment and
skill and the implementation of shocks to both the size of the capital stock and its
composition.8
A parallel analysis of changes in the global economy is carried out using a general
equilibrium model by Tyers and Yang (2000).  They construct a backcast over two decades in
                                                                                                                                                       
5
 See Krusell et al. (1997) and Tyers and Yang (2000).
6
 Sachs and Shatz (1994) and Wood (1994), among others, find some role for trade, while Abraham and Taylor
(1996) and Feenstra and Hansen (1996) focus on the contribution of out-sourcing and its associated effects on
both trade and home technology.  Haskel and Heden (1999) and Haskel and Slaughter (1998, 1999) emphasise
the evidence favouring skill-biased technical change associated with computerisation.  The dominance of the
latter is confirmed for the U.S. in a more recent empirical analysis by Morrison Paul and Siegel (2000).
7
 When substitution between labour and skill is elastic, the unit isoquant is drawn further inward the more skill
intensive is the technique and so, even at constant factor prices, the cost share of skill rises.  The common
presumption that automation enhances labour (is “labour saving”) is only consistent with a rise in the skill share
if the elasticity of substitution between skill and labour is less than unity.
8
 This disaggregation is also used by Kahn and Lim (1998).
3which observed changes in aggregate productivity and the skill premium are imposed as
exogenous while technical parameters are made endogenous.  This approach has the
advantage that it also enables them to control for other relevant macroeconomic shocks,
including changes in trade distortions and in labour market policy.  For the many regions
included in that study, however, data on the composition of capital stocks were unavailable.
When capital-skill complementarity is incorporated into all technologies, their results
therefore characterise the technical change that occurred in the last two decades as primarily
“capital augmentation”, reflecting unobserved compositional changes in capital stocks.
Moreover, this type of technical change is shown to have been most rapid in the US during
this period.
They also compare the implied pattern of technical change when the base technology
has capital-skill complementarity on the one hand and capital-skill substitution on the other.
When skill and capital are represented as substitutes, the implied technical change is skill-
enhancement.  Although the empirical evidence tends to support the model with capital-skill
complementarity,9 both technology characterisations could be consistent with the observed
pattern of long run technical change.  Where they differ, however, is in their implications for
short run behaviour.  Short run responses to technology shocks differ in that elasticities are
smaller, physical capital is sector specific and nominal rigidities can cause employment and
output fluctuations.  When other conditions are constant, however, they must accumulate into
the observed long run responses.  But other things have not been constant in recent decades.
For one thing, there is evidence that the magnitudes of annual technology shocks have
enlarged.  For another, capital has become more mobile internationally.  When a technology
shock alters the return on installed capital this changes the global pattern of investment and
output more substantially than in the beginning of the period.  Because the size of the change
in the return on installed capital depends on the characterisation of technologies and
technology shocks, these matter in the “new economy” era more than before.
In this paper we explore these short run implications by examining the simulated
response of the world economy to US “new economy” shocks.  In particular, we examine the
global implications of a technical change shock in the US alone and then combine it with an
investment shock so that the associated US expansion is financed in part from abroad,
following the pattern of the late 1990s.  We use a global comparative static multi-product
                                                
9
 See, for example, Hamermesh (1993).
4model like that on which the long run analysis of Tyers and Yang (2000) was based but which
has been adapted for short run macroeconomic analysis as in Yang and Tyers (2000).  In order
to focus on the contrast between capital-skill substitution and complementarity, for each
region and each industry within it we depart from the traditional representation of factor
demand in such models10 by constructing alternative nested CES production systems, with
and without skill-capital complementarity.
The model used is described in Section 2 and our construction of the alternative
technologies is discussed in Section 3.  The technology and investment shocks and their
implications are presented in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes.
2.  A Global Model for Short Run Comparative Statics
The model is adapted from a conventional neoclassical multi-region comparative
static model in real variables with price-taking households and all industries comprising
identical competitive firms.11  This original model provides the supply side of that used here.
It offers the following useful microeconomics: (1) a capital goods sector in each region to
service investment, (2) explicit savings in each region, combined with open regional capital
accounts that permit savings in one region to finance investment in others, (3) multiple
trading regions, goods and primary factors, (4) product differentiation by country of origin,
(5) empirically based differences in tastes and technology across regions, (6) non-homothetic
preferences, and (7) explicit transportation costs and indirect taxes on trade, production and
consumption.
All individual goods and services entering final and intermediate demand are CES
blends of home products and imports.  In turn, imports are CES composites of the products of
all regions the content of which depends on regional trading prices.  Savings are pooled
globally and investment is then allocated between regions from the global pool.  Within
regions, investment places demands on the domestic capital goods sector, which is also a CES
composite of home-produced goods, services and imports in the manner of government
spending.  The primary factors identified are land, natural resources, labour, skill and physical
                                                
10
 It has been the accepted practice in general equilibrium analysis to assume simple factor demand structures
implying unit elasticities of substitution between capital and labour.  See Shoven and Whalley (1992: 5.4) and
Dixon et al. (1992: 220).  For an application to labour markets, see Burfisher et al. (1994).
11
 A detailed description of the original is provided by Hertel (1997).
5capital.  Skill is separated from raw labour on occupational grounds, with occupations in the
“professional” categories of the ILO classification included as skilled.12
A key modification of the standard model code makes the government financially
independent, and so enables more explicit treatment of fiscal policy.  Direct taxes are
incorporated at the observed average income tax rates for each region.  Marginal tax rates are
therefore assumed constant at τ.  Regional households then receive regional factor income, YF,
and from this they pay direct tax τYF,.  The disposable income that remains is then divided
between private consumption and private saving.  Government saving, or the government
surplus, SG = T – G, is then simply revenue from direct taxes, τYF, and indirect taxes, TI, less
government spending, G, which could be exogenous or fixed as a proportion of GDP.13  Thus,
SG = TI + τYF - G.  The private saving and consumption decision is represented by a reduced
form exponential consumption equation with wealth effects included via the dependence of
consumption (and hence savings) on the interest rate.  Each region then contributes its total
(private plus government) saving, ST=SP + SG, to the global pool from which investment is
derived.
For each region, the above relations imply the balance of payments identity, which
sets the current account surplus equal to the capital account deficit: X – M = SP + SG – I.14
From the pool of global savings, investment is allocated across regions and places demands
on regional capital goods sectors.  In the short run considered, it does not add to the installed
capital stock, however. Also at this length of run, nominal wages are sticky in some regions
(the EU, Canada, Australasia and China) but flexible elsewhere.  In the spirit of comparative
statics, although price levels do change in response to shocks, no continuous inflation is
represented and so there is no distinction between the real and nominal interest rates.
In allocating the global savings pool as investment across regions, we have opted to
use the most flexible approach, implying a high level of global capital mobility.15  The
allocation ensures that the proportional change in investment is larger in regions, j, with high
values of the average rate of return on installed capital, rjc.  In this process, a global “expected
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 See Vo and Tyers (1995) and Liu et al. (1998) for the method adopted.
13
 TI includes revenue from taxes on production, consumption, factor use and trade, all of which are accounted
for in the original model and database.
14
 Note that there is no allowance for interregional capital ownership in the starting equilibrium.  At the outset,
therefore, there are no factor service flows and the current account is the same as the balance of trade.
15
 By which it is meant that households can direct their savings to any region in the world without impediment.
Installed capital, however, remains immobile even between sectors.
6return”, rw, is calculated such that Σj SjT = Σj Ij (rw, rjc, πj), where Ij is real investment in region j
and πj is a region-specific risk premium.16  The investment demand equation for region j takes
the form:
where Kj is the (exogenous) installed capital stock, β is a positive constant and ε is a negative
elasticity.  The numerator on the right hand side is the expected gross return on investment in
region j, so that (1+rj) = (1+rw)(1+πj) or rj ≈ rw+πj.
Note that our short run comparative static analysis does not require that the global
economy be in a steady state.  When shocks are imposed, the counterfactual return on
installed capital, rjc, need not be the same as the corresponding expected return on investment,
rj.  Such shocks, implemented in the current period, change income and savings and,
therefore, expected returns in directions that differ from the returns on installed capital,
particularly considering that capital is fixed in quantity and sectoral distribution.
To include the monetary sector in each region we simply add LM curves.  This
implies that regionally homogeneous nominal bonds are the only financial assets other than
regional money.  Even though there is no interregional ownership of installed capital in the
initial database these bonds are traded internationally, making it possible for savers in one
region to finance investment in another.17  The yield on the jth region’s bonds in the single
period represented by the model is the interest rate, rj, defined above.  Cash in advance
constraints then cause households to maintain portfolios including both bonds and non-
yielding money and the resulting demand for real money balances has the usual reduced form
dependence on GDP (transactions demand) and the interest rate.  This is equated with the
region’s real money supply, where purchasing power is measured in terms of its GDP
deflator, PY.
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 Before adding to the global pool, savings in each region is deflated using the regional capital goods price
index and then converted into US$ at the initial exchange rate.  The global investment allocation process then is
made in real volume terms.
17
 Since the initial database we use (GTAP Version IV) incorporates no “net income” or factor service
component in its current account, our initial equilibria must do likewise.  This implies the assumption that,
although there are no interregional bond holdings initially, the shocks implemented cause interregional
exchanges of bonds and hence a non-zero net income flow in future current accounts not represented.
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7Since all domestic transactions are assumed to use the home region’s money,
international transactions require currency exchange.  For this purpose, a single nominal
exchange rate, Ej, is defined for each region.  A single key region is identified (here the US)
relative to whose currency these nominal rates are defined.  For the US, then, E=1 and Ej is
the number of US dollars per unit of region j’s currency.  In essence, we are adding to the real
model one new equation per region (the LM curve linking the real money supply to GDP and
the interest rate) and one new (usually endogenous) variable per region, Ej.18
The bilateral rate between region i and region j is then simply the quotient of the two
exchange rates with the US, Eij = Ei /Ej.  Quotients such as this appear in all international
transactions.  The most straightforward of the international transactions in the original model
are trade transactions.  There the bilateral exchange rate is simply included in all import price
equations, along with cif/fob margins and trade taxes.  In the case of savings and investment,
the global pool of savings is accumulated in US dollars.  Investment, once allocated to region
j, is converted to that region’s currency at the rate Ej.  The third, and most cryptic, set of
international transactions in the original model concerns international transport services.
Payments associated with cif/fob margins are assumed to be made by the importer in US
dollars.  The global transport sector then demands inputs from each regional economy and
these transactions are converted at the appropriate regional rates.
Without nominal rigidities the model always exhibits money neutrality, both at the
regional and global levels.  Firms in the model respond to changes in nominal product, input
and factor prices but a real producer wage is calculated for labour as the quotient of the
nominal wage and the GDP deflator, so that w=W/PY.  Thus, money shocks always maintain
constant w when nominal rigidities are absent.  It is in the setting of the nominal wage, W,
that we have introduced nominal rigidities to the model.  A parameter, λ∈(0,1) is inserted,
such that
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 More precisely, since for the US E=1, we are adding one less (usually endogenous) variable.  Where nominal
exchange rates are to be endogenous and nominal money supplies exogenous, one additional variable must be
made endogenous.  We could, for example, balance this by making one price level exogenous, such as by having
US monetary policy target the change in the US CPI, PC.
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8where W0 is the initial value of the nominal wage, P0Y is the corresponding initial value of the
GDP deflator and Λ is a slack constant.  While ever Λ is exogenous and set a unity, the
nominal wage carries this relationship to the price level and the labour market will not clear
except in the unlikely event that equation (2) happens to yield a market clearing real wage.
The case where the labour market is fully flexible is represented by setting Λ as an
endogenous slack variable and thereby rendering (2) ineffective.  At the same time, labour
demand is forced to equate with exogenous labour supply to reflect the clearing market.
Because the length of run is short, the real part of the model incorporates smaller-
than-standard elasticities of substitution in both demand and supply.  The key elasticities of
substitution on the demand side are listed in Table 2.  These are set smaller than the standard
ones to an extent guided by a short run calibration exercise on the Asian crisis, described in
Yang and Tyers (2000).  The representation of production technologies is discussed in
Section 3, to follow.
3. Production Technology and Factor Demand
We adopt two alternative technologies, both of which are nested CES structures that
differ from those in the original model.  Our standard technology is the three level nest
illustrated in Figure 1.19  It allows the substitutability between raw labour and skill to differ
from that between these and other factors and it makes it possible to vary the degree of
substitutability between labour and skill without changing that between other factor pairs.
The weak separability essential to nested CES structures allows the production
function to take the following form:
where VI is the composite of intermediate inputs and VA is the value added composite of all
primary factors, αY, δVI and δVA are technology shifters to be used subsequently and φCI and
φVA are parameters that depend on the shares of VI and VA in total cost.20  Finally, the top-
                                                
19
 The original model has a two level structure with a Leontief split between intermediates and primary factors
(value added) and labour and skill are treated in the same way as the other three factors.
20
 In such CES structures the number of independent parameters is equal to the number of factors or inputs.
Here only the φs are independent and derived from the database.  The αs and the δs are shifters set to unity
unless the technology changes.
( ) ( )[ ] YYY VAVIY VAVAVIVIY ρρρ δφδφα 1)3( −−− +=
9level elasticity of substitution is σY=1/(1+ρY).  Following the primary factor branch of the
nest, the value-added composite is then
where VL is value added in labour and skill (a labour-skill composite) and the parameters play
the same roles as in (1), above.  The elasticity of substitution at this level is σVA=1/(1+ρVA).
To complete the nest, then, a similar formulation is offered for the labour-skill component of
value added, VL:
where L is raw labour and S is skill and the level-specific elasticity of substitution between
them is σVL=1/(1+ρVL).
Again, the initial values of the technology shifters α and δ, are unity.21  The
combination of (3) – (5) allows the proportional change in the demand for any factor or
intermediate input, Xi , denoted lower case as xi, to be expressed in terms of the corresponding
proportional changes in output, y, and proportional changes in all of the factor prices, pj, as
where ηij is the conditional elasticity of demand for input or factor i with respect to the price
of input or factor j.  These demand elasticities, [ηij], follow from the Allen partial elasticities
of substitution, [σij] via ηij = σij θj, where θj is the share of factor or input j in total cost.  The
Allen partials are conditional (output constant) elasticities of substitution for pairs of inputs
when more than two are used and where they are combined in a multi-level nest.  In the two-
factor single-level case they collapse to the branch elasticity (Allen 1938: 341, Hamermesh
1993: 23, 39).  They are symmetric (σij  = σji) and can be derived from the branch elasticities
of substitution, σY, σVA, and σVL by the method of Keller (1980: Ch.5, Appendix).  Those of
special interest for our present purpose are the own price elasticities for labour, ηLL, skill, ηSS
and capital, ηKK and the associated cross price elasticities, ηLS, ηSL, ηLK, ηKL, ηSK and ηKS.
The own price elasticity for labour, for example, takes the following form:
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 The remaining parameters are derived from the GTAP Version 4 database for each region, detailed in
McDougall et al. (1998a).
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where θL is the share of raw labour, θVL the combined share of labour and skill and θVA the
share of value added in total cost.22  And the cross elasticities between labour and skill and
labour and capital are:
where σLS and σLK are the Allen partial elasticities of substitution.  The remaining own and
cross price elasticities follow similarly.
We contrast this production structure with one that allows complementarity of
capital and skill, illustrated in Figure 2.  The highest level of the nest is the same as
previously, with the level of output indicated by equation (3).  Following the primary factor
branch of the nest, the value-added composite is now
where VKL is value added in capital, labour and skill.  Also as before, the elasticity of
substitution at this level is σVA=1/(1+ρVA).  The capital-labour-skill component of value
added, VKL is then:
where L is raw labour and KS is a capital-skill composite.  The level-specific or branch
elasticity of substitution is then σVKL=1/(1+ρVKL).  Finally, there is an additional level that
divides capital and skill:
where the branch elasticity of substitution at this lowest level is σVKS=1/(1+ρVKS).
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 For a single level system in which the elasticity of substitution is σ this collapses to -θ[σ(θL-1-1)]=-(1-θL)σ,
consistent with the treatment by Hamermesh (1993).
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]1)7( 11111 −+−+−−= −−−−− VAYVAVLVAVLLVLLLL θσθθσθθσθη
( ) ( )[ ]1)8( 1111 −−−−== −−−− VAYVAVLVAVLVLSSLSLS θσθθσθσθθση
( )[ ]1)9( 11 −−== −− VAYVAVAKKLKLK θσθσθθση
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In this case, the own price elasticity for capital takes the following form:
where θK is the share of capital, θVKS the combined share of capital, θVKL the combined share
of capital, skill and labour, and θVA is the share of value added in total cost.  Since capital and
skill are here treated symmetrically, the own price elasticity of demand for skill takes a
corresponding form.  And the cross elasticities between capital and skill and capital and
labour are:
where, again, σKS and σKL are Allen partial elasticities of substitution.  The remaining cross
price elasticities follow similarly.
The branch elasticities in both the substitution and complementarity cases vary
across industries by the same proportions as the “standard” set in the original GTAP Version
IV database.  The shorter length of run used here requires, however, that they be smaller than
the standard values and so their choice has been informed both by the calibration exercise
reported in Yang and Tyers (2000) and the contrasts between short and long run estimates by
Morrison Paul and Siegel (2000).  For the particular branch elasticities between capital,
labour and skill, we note the small short run elasticities between capital and labour reviewed
by Rowthorn (1999a and b) but have opted for larger values from the studies reviewed by
Hamermesh (1993) and the estimates of Krusell et al. (1997), as indicated in Tables 3 and 4.
The implied own and cross price elasticities are then listed in Table 5.  The parameters of the
macro part of the model (those in the consumption and investment demand equations and in
the real money demand, or LM, equation) are listed in Table 6.
4. Simulating US “New Economy” Shocks
The shocks:
The results obtained by Tyers and Yang (2000) offer two alternative
characterisations of technical change in the final two decades of the 20th century.  First, if
technology is characterised following Kahn and Lim (1998) as embodying substitution
between capital and skill, the principal technical change takes the form of skill enhancement
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]1)13( 1111111 −+−+−+−−= −−−−−−− VAYVAVKLVAVKLVKSVKLVKSKVKSKKK θσθθσθθσθθσθη
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]1)14( 111111 −−−−−−== −−−−−− VAYVAVKLVAVKLVKSVKLVKSVKSSSKSKS θσθθσθθσθσθθση
( ) ( )[ ]1)15( 1111 −−−−== −−−− VAYVAVKLVAVKLVKLLLKLKL θσθθσθσθθση
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or an increase in δS in equation (5).  If it is characterised following Krusell et al. (1997) as
embodying capital-skill complementarity, the implied technical change is capital
enhancement, or an increase in δK in equation (12).  Most economy-wide modelling assumes
the former while the preponderance of empirical evidence supports the latter.  Our purpose
here is to ask what difference it makes in a short run setting.  To do this we note from Tyers
and Yang (2000) that the change was the most rapid in the US.  When the base technology
exhibited capital-skill complementarity, their results implied that the technical change was
capital enhancement at an average rate of 1.7 per cent per year.  When capital and skill were
considered substitutes, however, the implied change was skill enhancement at an average rate
of 3.3 per cent per year.
One approach would be to simply impose these annual averages as short run shocks.
The evidence of Oliner and Sichel (2000) indicate, however, that the pace of technical change
accelerated in the US in the latter half of the 1990s, with the effect of “a one per cent step-up
in aggregate labour productivity growth”.  We therefore focus on a technical change shock in
the US alone and the annual rates are increased to a three per cent capital enhancement in the
case of capital-skill complementarity and a five per cent skill enhancement when capital and
skill are substitutes.  To better represent what happened in the second half of the 1990s,
however, we combine this with a five per cent increase in real investment in the US.  This is
about the size of the step-up in US real investment in the mid-1990s, which occurred as
savers worldwide were attracted to the promise of high returns in the US “new economy”. 23
Both the technology and investment shocks played key roles in the overall pattern of change
in the global economy in that period.  We do not, and indeed cannot in a comparative static
model, endogenise the change in the locational preferences of savers that took place in the
1990s and which favoured investment in the US.  Both the technical change shock and the
investment shock are therefore imposed exogenously.
The closure:
Before we describe the scenarios in detail, it is useful to reflect briefly on their
technical underpinnings.  The model is simply a set of n non-linear simultaneous equations in
n+m
 variables. In such a system, only n variables can be endogenous.  We must find values
elsewhere for the remaining m exogenous variables.  The software we use draws on the initial
13
database for 1995 to derive initial values for the entire n+m variables.  Then, in effect, it
transforms the equations so as to allow the selection of any n of these variables as
endogenous.  The remaining m variables are then either assumed to hold their database values
or they can be subjected to exogenous shocks.  This selection of variables as either
endogenous or exogenous is what we refer to as the “closure”.
For example, in a “normal” simulation, such as when the technology shocks are
imposed alone, the change in investment is endogenous and the investment premium factor
[(1+π) in equation 1] is exogenous.  The technical changes are imposed as exogenous shocks
to parameters that are already exogenous, namely to δS in equation (5) for the factor
substitution case or δK in equation (12) for the capital-skill complementarity case. When we
implement the US investment shock, however, we wish to represent a change in the locational
preferences of savers.  We do this by imposing a change in the investment premium of
sufficient magnitude that it yields the requisite five per cent rise in US investment.  And this
is achieved by the construction of the closure.  We simply make the change in investment in
the US exogenous and impose a five per cent shock to it while making the US investment
premium endogenous.  These are the only exogenous shocks imposed yet a great deal depends
on the choice of which remaining variables will be exogenous.
First, in the short run physical capital is industry specific and fixed in quantity in all
regions.  The return on installed capital is therefore endogenous and it differs by sector.
Investment behaviour (equation 1) is then directed by the aggregate return on all of a region’s
installed capital.  Monetary policy is assumed to target the domestic CPI, PC, in all regions
except China, which maintains fixed nominal parity with the US dollar.  This implies that
nominal money supplies are endogenous in all regions and these are balanced by the
exogeneity of PC, which is held constant, in all regions except China and the nominal
exchange rate, E, which is also held constant, in China.  Monetary policy matters at this
length of run because it sets the price level and hence, where the nominal wage is rigid, the
real wage of unskilled workers.24  In the EU, labour market regulation is assumed to deliver a
nominal wage that is fixed in the short run.  In Canada and Australasia, and in China, some
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 See IMF (2000): Figure 1.2.
24
 Because savings are fully mobile internationally, monetary policy in one region has no direct effect on the
domestic interest rate while ever the interest premium remains exogenous.  Recall from equation (1) that current
investment is allocated to regions where the rate of return on installed capital is high.  This rate of return and the
regional interest rate, which is formed originally in the global market for loanable funds, will generally be
different in short run departures from the steady state of the type simulated.
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wage stickiness is assumed, such the nominal wage is assumed to adjust by half of any
proportional change in the CPI (λ=0.5 in equation 2).25  In these three regions the level of
employment is therefore endogenous.  On the other hand, in the US, Japan and other Asia,
equation (2) is actually disabled to allow the nominal wage to adjust to clear the labour
market and so keep employment fixed and the real wage of unskilled workers endogenous.
With this closure common to every case, four simulations are carried out.  These are,
first, assuming capital and skill are complements: (1) the imposition of a 3% capital
enhancement in the US manufacturing and services sectors, and (2) the combination of this
3% capital enhancement with the observed 5% rise in US investment.  The results from these
experiments are displayed in Tables 7 and 9, respectively.  Second, assuming capital and skill
are substitutes, we simulate (1) the imposition of a 5% skill enhancement in the US
manufacturing and services sectors, and (2) the combination of a 5% skill enhancement with
the observed 5% rise in US investment.  The results from these two experiments are displayed
in Tables 8 and 10.
The effects of the US technology shocks alone:
Not surprisingly, irrespective of the representation of the base technology the
technical change is positive from the point of view of the US.  It pushes out the production
possibility frontier and it raises real GDP, real consumption and real unit factor rewards.26
Despite this common feature, the two technology characterisations yield quite different
effects on the US economy.  Consider first the case in which capital and skill are
complementary.  The rise in “effective” capital use reduces the real reward of “effective”
capital in the US and raises the real reward of its complement, skill.  Because capital demand
is inelastic in the short run and responds negatively to a rise in the price of skill, the capital
enhancement reduces the price of physical capital, or the real return to the fixed capital stock.
This has a direct distributional effect, causing owners of physical capital to be reap a smaller
return in the short run.  More importantly, in our world of mobile savings, a fall in the return
on installed capital in the US reduces its share of the world’s investment.
                                                
25
 Recall that the CPI is fixed by monetary targeting in all regions except China, so that in Canada and
Australasia, variations in the nominal wage and real wages depend on deviations in the GDP deflator.  Only in
China are there substantial changes in both the nominal and real wages with the nominal wage change stemming
from equation (2).
26
 The only exception to the general pattern of increased factor rewards is the real return to physical capital in the
case where capital is enhanced.  The reasons for this are discussed subsequently.
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It is true that the expansion in US GDP and therefore in US savings tends to reduce
the global interest rate, rw, and hence the US interest rate.27  But this fall is not sufficient to
offset the more direct effect on US investment (via equation 1) of the proportionally larger
decline in the return on US installed capital.28  US investment therefore falls and investment
in other regions rises.  These indirect effects on the distribution of the world’s investment
shift the US capital account towards deficit and the capital accounts of the other regions
toward surplus.  This causes a real depreciation in the US relative to its trading partners and,
with the monetary policy settings assumed, a nominal depreciation as well.  The consequence
of this for the US is that relative price changes advantage tradeables sectors over services and
so the expansion of the US economy is strongest in the manufacturing sector.
In the case where capital and skill are substitutes, the skill enhancement shock, while
also yielding a substantial rise in US GDP, has the opposite consequence for the US share of
the world’s investment and hence for exchange rates.  The rise in “effective” skill use in the
US increases the real reward of its substitute, physical capital and so there is a rise in the real
return to installed capital and therefore a rise in US investment.  Although US savings rise,
those in the rest of the world fall so that there is a net decline in global savings and interest
rates rise, though not by enough to prevent the increase in US investment.  The rise in US
savings is also less than the change in US investment and so there is a boost to the US capital
account surplus and a US real appreciation relative to the rest of the world.  With the
monetary policy settings assumed, this implies nominal appreciations against all regions
except China, which targets its nominal rate against the US dollar.  The effects of this on
prices advantage the less-traded services sectors in the US most and the short run GDP
expansion is larger than with the capital enhancement shock.
Turning to the rest of the world, the US shocks have indirect effects that are
transmitted via two mechanisms.  First, the technical change in the US shifts out its
production possibility frontier by magnitudes that vary across commodities depending on
their capital and skill intensities.  This alters the terms of trade both in the US and abroad.
Second, because the factor enhancement shocks change the return on installed capital in the
US, they also change the global distribution of investment.  This has two important
                                                
27
 Global savings is also increased in this case by economic expansion in the rest of the world as investment rises
there.
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consequences.  Most directly, changes in investment affect aggregate demand.  Less directly,
changes in investment alter flows on the capital accounts of all countries and hence cause
changes in real exchange rates.  As it turns out, the dominant effect on overall economic
activity is the change in investment.  When that is positive in one of the other regions there is
a partially offsetting real appreciation but there is also a terms of trade gain.
Thus, when capital and skill are complementary and capital is enhanced in the US,
investment falls there but rises in other regions.  The economies in the other regions therefore
expand.  This expansion is aided in the sticky wage regions by rises in producer prices
associated with the real appreciation and hence falls in real wages and rises in employment.
With the exception of China, central banks in each region target the respective CPIs.  This
allows GDP deflators to rise because imports (contained in the CPI) become cheaper relative
to home goods.  When capital and skill are substitutes and skill is enhanced in the US, on the
other hand, the picture for other regions is reversed.  Investment rises in the US and falls
abroad.  Other regions enjoy a real depreciation but it is insufficient to offset the investment
change and so their economies contract.  In economies with sticky nominal wages, this
contraction is exacerbated by a fall in producer prices (and hence in the GDP deflator) and
hence a rise in real wages and a fall in employment.29
Adding the investment shock:
In the latter half of the 1990s a step-up of about five per cent was observed in US
investment.  On the face of it this is evidence in support of capital-skill substitution, since
with that technology our simulations show a rise in US investment of three per cent.  An
alternative view is that the new-economy boom in the US attracted savers abroad who
expected high returns in the long run from information technology investments and the
adaptation of information technology for use in older industries.  One way to represent this in
our comparative static analysis is as a fall in the US risk premium.  Indeed, we can even ask
the model how much the US premium need change in order to attract the observed five per
cent increase in investment.  So this is what we do.  We change the closure to make US
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 Our investors are myopic here in that the expected long run effect of the capital enhancement on the return to
US installed capital is positive.  This is made clear when the same shock is administered with the long run
elasticities employed in Tyers and Yang (2000).
29
 This is exacerbated in China by a monetary policy that targets the US dollar rate.  The real depreciation
against the US requires a decline in the domestic price level and a rise in the real wage that is larger than in the
other regions.
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investment exogenous and the US premium endogenous, leaving all other settings the same.
For each technology specification we then impose an exogenous five per cent investment
shock in the US.
Taken alone, the US investment shock is more clearly zero-sum than the technology
shocks.  It relocates investment away from the other regions and, the US real appreciation that
follows notwithstanding, the other regional economies contract while the US economy
expands.  Within the US, the fall in the interest premium causes the home interest rate to fall
relative to the global one and this suppresses US savings.  The larger is the required reduction
in the interest premium, therefore, the larger is the shift toward surplus on the US capital
account and the larger is the US real appreciation relative to the other regions.  And the larger
the US real appreciation, the more the US expansion and the foreign contraction is centred on
the services sectors.
Turning to our results, the US investment shock is combined with each technology
shock in turn.  Recall that, when capital and skill were considered substitutes and US capital
was enhanced, the return on US installed capital fell as did US investment.  Our requirement
that the US premium adjust to allow a five per cent rise in US investment necessitates a
substantial decline in the premium, as indicated in Table 9.  As expected, this also yields a
substantial US real appreciation relative to the rest of the world and hence a service sector led
US expansion.  In other regions, the loss of investment causes a general contraction that is
largest in their services sectors while their tradeable goods sectors expand.30
When we characterised capital and skill as substitutes and imposed a US skill
enhancement, recall that the return on US installed capital rose and global investment was
redistributed in favour of the US, which then experienced a real appreciation relative to the
other regions.  US investment rose three per cent.  The decline in the US interest premium
needed to push this up to five per cent is therefore smaller than in the capital-skill
complementarity case.  This is made clear in Table 10.  Although the incremental effects of
the investment shock are therefore smaller in this case, the net effects of the technology and
investment shocks on the regional distribution of global output and real consumption are
similar to those emerging when capital and skill are considered complements.  This is not
surprising since the US investment shock has the same magnitude in both cases.  Yet the
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sectoral and distributional effects within regions differ substantially between the two
technology characterisations.  When capital and skill are complements, the skill premium is
raised more in the US and it falls by more in the other regions.  Since a larger real
appreciation occurs in this case, some US tradeable goods sectors contract and land and
natural resource rents actually decline.
5. Conclusion
In an earlier study of technical changes affecting the global economy in the period
1975-95, Tyers and Yang (2000) found two alternative technology characterisations to offer
equivalent explanations.  Technologies could either be characterised as exhibiting capital-
skill complementarity, in which case the technical change would have been capital
enhancement, or capital-skill substitution, in which case the technical change would have
been skill enhancement.  For our long run analysis it did not seem to matter which of these
characterisations was adopted.  This paper examines one reason why it does matter.  The two
characterisations have different implications in the short run when other properties of the
global economy are changing through time.  Two key properties of the global economy
appear to have been changing in during the last two decades.  First, international capital
mobility has increased, so that the global distribution of the world’s investment is now more
sensitive to regional differences in interest rates and returns on installed capital than it was in
the 1970s.  And second, there is evidence that the shocks associated with the adoption of
information technology grew larger during the period.
To examine the implications of the two technology characterisations in the “new
economy” era of the late 1990s, we construct a short run macroeconomic model and embed
the two technology characterisations in it.  The model is then subjected to technology and
investment shocks.  The results indicate, first, that the two technology characterisations are
not equivalent in short run analysis when capital is internationally mobile, mainly because
technology shocks have different implications for the return to installed capital and hence the
global distribution of investment.  Second, when capital and skill are complementary,
consistent with key empirical studies of skilled labour demand (Hamermesh 1993, and
Krusell et al. 1997), the technology shock alone does not explain the flood of savings into the
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 The case of China differs again here.  Its real depreciation, combined with its exchange rate targeting, requires
a fall in home prices and hence a rise in its real wage.  This causes a substantial loss of employment.  For more
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US that was observed in the “new economy” era.  For this, expectations of increased future
returns on US investment are required.
Third, when the technology shock is combined with a shock to the US risk premium
sufficient to deliver the observed rise in US investment, the US suffers a substantial real
appreciation against the other regions that redistributes resources away from US tradeable
goods industries and toward services.  Although the skill premium rises, land and natural
resource rents decline.  And, finally, in the other regions, the primary effect of the combined
new economy shocks is to redistribute investment away from them and into the US.  This
causes contractions in their less-traded services sectors while their tradeable goods sectors
tend to expand.
A more complete comparison of technology models and their relevance for the new
economy era will require a more careful examination of the shifts in balances of payments
and the associated sectoral and distributional changes that took place in the late 1990s than
has been attempted here.  Our goal has been to use model simulations to help suggest what to
look for in framing more accurate empirical tests with structural underpinnings.
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Table 1:  Model structure
_________________________________________________________________________
Regions Share of 1995 world GDPf
1. Rapidly growing Asiaa   5.1
2. Japan 18.0
3. Chinab   2.5
4. European Unionc 29.0
5. United States 25.2
6. Canada and Australasia   3.5
7. Rest of world 16.8
Primary factors
1. Agricultural land
2. Natural resources
3. Skill
4. Labour
5. Physical capital
Sectorse
1. All agriculture
2. Mining and energy (coal, oil, gas and other minerals)
3. Skill-intensive manufacturing (petroleum, paper, chemicals, processed minerals,
metals, motor vehicles and other transport equipment, electronic
equipment and other machinery and equipment)
4. Labour-intensive manufacturing (textiles, apparel, leather and wood products,
metal products, other manufactures)
5. Skill-intensive services (electricity, gas, water, financial services and public
administration)
6. Labour-intensive services (construction, retail and wholesale trade, dwellings)
____________________________________________________________________
a Korea (Rep.), Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Hong Kong and
Taiwan.
b China excludes Hong Kong and Taiwan.
c The European Union of 15.
d These are aggregates of the 50 sector GTAP Version 4 database.  See McDougall et al. (1998a).
e Share of 1995 GDP in US$ measured at market prices and exchange rates.
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Table 2:  Short Run Elasticities of substitution in final and intermediate product demanda
Sector
In product demand,
between domestic and
imported
In import demand,
between regions of
origin
Agriculture 1.8 3.4
Mining 2.0 4.1
Manufacturing:  labour intensive 2.7 5.8
                         skill intensive 1.6 3.3
Services:            labour intensive 0.9 1.9
                         skill intensive 1.0 1.9
a These are group-specific weighted averages across the 50 industries defined in the database.  The
structure of intermediate demand is as indicated in Figure 1.  The CDE parameters governing substitution in final
demand are discussed in McDougall et al. (1998b).
Source: GTAP Database Version 4.1.  See McDougall et al. (1998a).
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Table 3:  Branch elasticities of substitution in the case where all factors are substitutes
Sector
In production
between
intermediates
and primary
factors, σY
In value added,
between labour-
skill, capital,
resources and
land, σVA
Between
labour and
skill, σVLS
Agriculture 0.0 0.1 0.4
Mining 0.0 0.1 0.4
Manufacturing:  labour intensive 0.0 0.6 1.5
                         skill intensive 0.0 0.6 1.5
Services:            labour intensive 0.0 0.8 1.8
                         skill intensive 0.0 0.6 1.5
Source:  The value added branch elasticities are larger than the standard GTAP factor substitution elasticities, to
reflect the long run as explained in the text.  See Table 19.2 of McDougall et al. (1998b).
Table 4:  Branch elasticities of substitution in the case where capital and skill are
complements
Sector
In production
between
intermediates
and primary
factors, σY
In value added,
between capital-
labour-skill,
resources and
land, σVA
Between
capital-
skill and
labour,
σVKL
Between
capital
and skill,
σVKS
Agriculture 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.2
Mining 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.2
Manufacturing:  labour intensive 0.0 0.6 1.4 0.4
                         skill intensive 0.0 0.6 1.6 0.4
Services:            labour intensive 0.0 0.8 2.0 0.5
                         skill intensive 0.0 0.6 1.6 0.4
Source:  The value added branch elasticities are larger than the standard GTAP factor substitution elasticities, to
reflect the long run as explained in the text.  See Table 19.2 of McDougall et al. (1998b).
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 Table 5:  Implied Short Run Elasticities of Primary Factor Demand in the United Statesa
Own price Cross price
Sector: Labour,
L
Skill,
S
Capital,
K
K-L L-K K-S S-K S-L L-S
All factors substitutes
Agriculture -0.09 -0.38 -0.06 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.31 0.02
Mining -0.17 -0.30 -0.06 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.23 0.10
Labour intensive mfg -0.54 -1.20 -0.36 0.27 0.24 0.09 0.24 0.96 0.30
Skill-intensive mfg -0.75 -0.98 -0.37 0.22 0.23 0.15 0.23 0.75 0.52
Labour intensive services -0.65 -1.48 -0.47 0.37 0.33 0.10 0.33 1.15 0.32
Skill intensive services -0.90 -0.77 -0.43 0.20 0.17 0.24 0.17 0.60 0.73
Capital and skill complements
Agriculture -0.19 -0.10 -0.16 0.11 0.13 0.00 -0.06 0.11 0.01
Mining -0.24 -0.10 -0.12 0.06 0.15 0.00 -0.02 0.06 0.03
Labour intensive mfg -0.66 -0.40 -0.49 0.54 0.49 -0.05 -0.14 0.54 0.17
Skill-intensive mfg -0.76 -0.36 -0.38 0.44 0.46 -0.06 -0.08 0.44 0.30
Labour intensive services -0.75 -0.46 -0.59 0.65 0.58 -0.06 -0.19 0.65 0.18
Skill intensive services -0.77 -0.35 -0.33 0.38 0.32 -0.05 -0.03 0.38 0.45
a These are conditional elasticities for the U.S.  Those for other regions will differ as factor shares in total cost differ.
Source: Branch elasticities in Tables 3 and 4 and factor and input shares for the United States in 1995, drawn from the GTAP database (Mcdougall et al. 1998a).
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Table 6:  Key Macroeconomic Parameters in Short Run Analysisa
Elasticity of
     Real consumption to the interest rate, δ -0.10
     Real consumption to disposable income, µb 0.65–0.80
     Investment: (K+I)/K to gross interest ratio (1+r)/(1+rc), ε -0.10
     Real money demand to income, η  0.50
     Real money demand to the interest rate, φ -0.10
a   In this preliminary application, most of these parameter values are common to all regions.
b   RG Asia 0.7, Japan 0.75, China 0.65, USA, EU, Canada/Australasia 0.8, rest of world 0.75
Sources:  Indicative estimates.  See Yang and Tyers (2000).
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Table 7:  The simulated short run global effects of a 3% capital enhancement alone in the US
(capital and skill complementary)a
Change in: USA EU Canada
Aust
NZ
Japan China Rapidly
Growing
Asia
Nominal exchange rate(US$/•), Ei (%) 0.0 3.0 2.9 3.0 0.0* 2.6
Domestic CPI, PC (%) 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 2.4 0.0*
Domestic GDP deflator, PY (%) -0.3 0.1 0.3 0.0 2.3 0.0
Nominal money supply, MS (%) 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.1 2.6 0.1
Real effective exchange rateb, eiR (%) -3.3 0.6 2.1 0.9 -0.1 0.4
Real exchange rate against USA, eijR (%) 0.0 3.4 3.5 3.4 2.6 3.0
Terms of tradec(%) -2.5 0.2 1.3 0.4 -0.2 0.1
Global interest rate, rw -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
Investment premium factor, (1+π) (%) 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 0.0*
Home interest rate, r (%) -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
Return on installed capitald, rc (%) -2.1 0.2 1.0 0.0 0.3 0.1
Real domestic investment, I (%) -2.4 1.0 2.0 0.5 0.5 0.4
Real consumption, C (%) 0.6 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.1
Balance of trade, X-M (US$b) 36.5 -15.4 -2.2 -6.8 1.1 -2.8
Real gross sectoral output (%)
      Agriculture 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0
      Mining 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2
      Manufacturing: labour-intensive 1.4 0.0 -0.3 -0.1 0.5 -0.1
                               skill-intensive 1.8 -0.2 -0.6 -0.2 0.3 -0.2
      Services: labour-intensive 0.7 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.1
                      skill-intensive 0.9 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.0
Real GDP, Y (%) 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.0
Unskilled wage and employment
Nominal (unskilled) wage, W (%): 0.2 0.0* 0.0* 0.1 1.2* 0.0
Production real wage, w=W/PY (%): 0.4 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 -1.1 -0.1
Employment, LD (%) 0.0* 0.1 0.3 0.0* 0.9 0.0*
Unit factor rewards CPI deflated (%)
     Labour 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 -1.2 0.0
     Skill 3.9 0.0 0.4 0.1 -0.1 0.0
     Capital -1.4 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.0
     Land 11.0 0.4 0.2 -0.2 1.8 0.4
     Natural resources 11.7 2.2 3.6 0.3 4.9 1.9
a All variables shown are endogenous, except for the CPI change in all regions but China, the US-China
nominal exchange rate, the level of real investment in the US, the investment premia on interest rates in
the other regions, the nominal wage of low skill workers in the EU, CANZ and China and the levels of
employment in the US, Japan and RG Asia.  The exogenous changes are marked with an asterisk (*).
b Change in the trade weighted average value of eijR=(Ei/Ej) PiY/PjY over regions j.
c Change in the value of exports at endogenous prices, weighted by fixed 1995 (base period) export
volumes, divided by the value of imports, weighted by fixed 1995 import volumes.
d Per cent change in payments to capital less the per cent change in the capital goods price index.
Source: Model simulations discussed in the text.
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Table 8:  The simulated short run global effects of a 5% skill enhancement alone in the US
(capital and skill substitutes)a
Change in: USA EU Canada
Aust,
NZ
Japan China Rapidly
Growing
Asia
Nominal exchange rate(US$/•), Ei (%) 0.0 -1.4 -0.2 -1.4 0.0* -0.8
Domestic CPI, PC (%) 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* -0.8 0.0*
Domestic GDP deflator, PY (%) 0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.8 -0.1
Nominal money supply, MS (%) 0.7 -0.2 0.1 -0.1 -1.0 -0.1
Real effective exchange rateb, eiR (%) 1.0 -1.0 0.3 -0.9 0.0 -0.1
Real exchange rate against USA, eijR (%) 0.0 -1.6 -0.2 -1.6 -0.9 -1.0
Terms of tradec(%) 0.7 -0.4 0.5 -1.0 0.0 -0.1
Global interest rate, rw 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Investment premium factor, (1+π) (%) 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 0.0*
Home interest rate, r (%) 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Return on installed capitald, rc (%) 2.6 -0.5 0.3 -0.1 -0.5 0.0
Real domestic investment, I (%) 3.0 -1.5 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 -0.3
Real consumption, C (%) 1.5 -0.3 0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1
Balance of trade, X-M (US$b) -31.1 20.6 0.2 6.8 0.7 2.0
Real gross sectoral output (%)
      Agriculture 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.1
      Mining 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.2
      Manufacturing: labour-intensive 0.6 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.1
                               skill-intensive 0.8 0.1 -0.2 0.2 -0.2 0.0
      Services: labour-intensive 1.4 -0.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1
                      skill-intensive 1.6 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0
Real GDP, Y (%) 1.3 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0
Unskilled wage and employment
Nominal (unskilled) wage, W (%): 0.3 0.0* 0.0* -0.2 -0.4* -0.3
Production real wage, w=W/PY (%): 0.2 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.4 -0.2
Employment, LD (%) 0.0* -0.2 0.0 0.0* -0.4 0.0*
Unit factor rewards CPI deflated (%)
     Labour 0.3 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.4 -0.3
     Skill 1.8 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3
     Capital 2.1 -0.3 0.2 0.0 -0.4 -0.1
     Land 2.2 1.8 -0.2 2.3 -1.0 1.1
     Natural resources 6.5 5.9 5.0 3.6 3.6 3.4
a All variables shown are endogenous, except for the CPI change in all regions but China, the US-China
nominal exchange rate, the level of real investment in the US, the investment premia on interest rates in
the other regions, the nominal wage of low skill workers in the EU, CANZ and China and the levels of
employment in the US, Japan and RG Asia.  The exogenous changes are marked with an asterisk (*).
b Change in the trade weighted average value of eijR=(Ei/Ej) PiY/PjY over regions j.
c Change in the value of exports at endogenous prices, weighted by fixed 1995 (base period) export
volumes, divided by the value of imports, weighted by fixed 1995 import volumes.
d Per cent change in payments to capital less the per cent change in the capital goods price index.
Source: Model simulations discussed in the text.
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Table 9:  The simulated short run global effects of a 3% capital enhancement combined with
a 5% investment increase in the US (capital and skill complementary)a
Change in: USA EU Canada
Aust,
NZ
Japan China Rapidly
Growing
Asia
Nominal exchange rate(US$/•), Ei (%) 0.0 -3.6 -2.5 -3.9 0.0* -2.9
Domestic CPI, PC (%) 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* -2.6 0.0*
Domestic GDP deflator, PY (%) 0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -2.5 -0.1
Nominal money supply, MS (%) 1.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -2.8 -0.2
Real effective exchange rateb, eiR (%) 3.7 -1.3 -1.2 -1.8 0.3 -0.4
Real exchange rate against USA, eijR (%) 0.0 -4.0 -2.9 -4.3 -2.8 -3.2
Terms of tradec(%) 2.6 -0.5 -0.3 -1.5 0.3 -0.1
Global interest rate, rw 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
Investment premium factor, (1+π) (%) -5.1 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 0.0*
Home interest rate, r (%) -4.4 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
Return on installed capitald, rc (%) -0.9 -0.5 -0.3 -0.2 -0.5 -0.1
Real domestic investment, I (%) 5.0* -2.0 -1.5 -1.2 -0.9 -0.7
Real consumption, C (%) 1.6 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.4 -0.1
Balance of trade, X-M (US$b) -59.5 27.5 2.2 13.8 -0.5 4.6
Real gross sectoral output (%)
      Agriculture -0.4 0.1 0.0 0.3 -0.4 0.1
      Mining -0.2 0.2 0.1 0.5 -0.1 0.2
      Manufacturing: labour-intensive 0.4 -0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.6 0.1
                               skill-intensive 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 -0.6 0.1
      Services: labour-intensive 1.8 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.7 -0.2
                      skill-intensive 0.9 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.5 0.0
Real GDP, Y (%) 1.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.5 0.0
Unskilled wage and employment
Nominal (unskilled) wage, W (%): 1.2 0.0* 0.0* -0.2 -1.3* -0.2
Production real wage, w=W/PY (%): 0.9 0.1 0.1 -0.1 1.3 -0.1
Employment, LD (%) 0.0* -0.2 -0.3 0.0* -1.2 0.0*
Unit factor rewards CPI deflated (%)
     Labour 1.2 0.0 0.0 -0.2 1.3 -0.2
     Skill 4.7 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.2
     Capital -1.0 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 -0.4 -0.2
     Land -3.5 0.8 0.2 2.4 -2.0 1.0
     Natural resources -1.6 3.4 2.5 3.1 -1.2 1.9
a All variables shown are endogenous, except for the CPI change in all regions but China, the US-China
nominal exchange rate, the level of real investment in the US, the investment premia on interest rates in
the other regions, the nominal wage of low skill workers in the EU, CANZ and China and the levels of
employment in the US, Japan and RG Asia.  The exogenous changes are marked with an asterisk (*).
b Change in the trade weighted average value of eijR=(Ei/Ej) PiY/PjY over regions j.
c Change in the value of exports at endogenous prices, weighted by fixed 1995 (base period) export
volumes, divided by the value of imports, weighted by fixed 1995 import volumes.
d Per cent change in payments to capital less the per cent change in the capital goods price index.
Source: Model simulations discussed in the text.
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Table 10:  The simulated short run global effects of a 5% skill enhancement combined with a
5% investment increase in the US (capital and skill substitutes)a
Change in: USA EU Canada
Aust,
NZ
Japan China Rapidly
Growing
Asia
Nominal exchange rate(US$/•), Ei (%) 0.0 -2.9 -1.6 -3.0 0.0* -2.1
Domestic CPI, PC (%) 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* -2.2 0.0*
Domestic GDP deflator, PY (%) 0.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 -2.1 -0.1
Nominal money supply, MS (%) 1.0 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 -2.4 -0.1
Real effective exchange rateb, eiR (%) 2.7 -1.5 -0.5 -1.4 -0.1 -0.2
Real exchange rate against USA, eijR (%) 0.0 -3.3 -1.8 -3.3 -2.4 -2.4
Terms of tradec(%) 2.0 -0.5 0.1 -1.4 0.0 -0.1
Global interest rate, rw 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Investment premium factor, (1+π) (%) -1.4 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 0.0*
Home interest rate, r (%) -0.8 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Return on installed capitald, rc (%) 2.9 -0.8 -0.1 -0.1 -0.8 -0.1
Real domestic investment, I (%) 5.0* -2.3 -1.0 -1.0 -1.1 -0.6
Real consumption, C (%) 1.7 -0.4 0.0 -0.1 -0.4 -0.1
Balance of trade, X-M (US$b) -53.2 31.4 1.5 10.6 0.8 3.5
Real gross sectoral output (%)
      Agriculture -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.2 0.0
      Mining 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.2
      Manufacturing: labour-intensive 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.2 0.1
                               skill-intensive 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.3 -0.3 0.1
      Services: labour-intensive 1.7 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.6 -0.1
                      skill-intensive 1.5 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.4 0.0
Real GDP, Y (%) 1.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.4 0.0
Unskilled wage and employment
Nominal (unskilled) wage, W (%): 0.6 0.0* 0.0* -0.3 -1.1* -0.3
Production real wage, w=W/PY (%): 0.4 0.2 0.0 -0.2 1.1 -0.2
Employment, LD (%) 0.0* -0.2 -0.1 0.0* -0.8 0.0*
Unit factor rewards CPI deflated (%)
     Labour 0.6 0.0 0.0 -0.3 1.1 -0.3
     Skill 2.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 0.1 -0.3
     Capital 2.1 -0.4 0.0 0.0 -0.7 -0.1
     Land -2.0 1.8 -0.3 2.7 -2.4 1.0
     Natural resources 3.0 6.1 4.8 4.1 2.2 3.3
a All variables shown are endogenous, except for the CPI change in all regions but China, the US-China
nominal exchange rate, the level of real investment in the US, the investment premia on interest rates in
the other regions, the nominal wage of low skill workers in the EU, CANZ and China and the levels of
employment in the US, Japan and RG Asia.  The exogenous changes are marked with an asterisk (*).
b Change in the trade weighted average value of eijR=(Ei/Ej) PiY/PjY over regions j.
c Change in the value of exports at endogenous prices, weighted by fixed 1995 (base period) export
volumes, divided by the value of imports, weighted by fixed 1995 import volumes.
d Per cent change in payments to capital less the per cent change in the capital goods price index.
Source: Model simulations discussed in the text.
